Kantara Initiative

User-Managed Access (UMA) 2.0 Grant for OAuth 2.0 Authorization

Version:2.0
 
Date:2017-7-26
 
Editor:Eve Maler, ForgeRock
 
Authors:Maciej Machulak, Self
Justin Richer, Bespoke Engineering

Abstract

This specification defines a means for a client, representing a requesting party, to use a permission ticket to request an OAuth 2.0 access token to gain access to a protected resource asynchronously from the time a resource owner authorizes access.

Status of This Document

This technical specification is a Draft Recommendation produced by the User-Managed Access Work Group. See the Kantara Initiative Operating Procedures for more information.

Copyright Notice

Copyright © 2017 Kantara Initiative and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to the Kantara IPR Policy - Option Patent & Copyright: Reciprocal Royalty Free with Opt-Out to Reasonable And Non discriminatory (RAND) (HTML version).


Table of Contents


1. Introduction

This specification defines an extension OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] grant. The grant enhances OAuth capabilities in the following ways:

For example, bank customer (resource owner) Alice with a bank account service (resource server) can use a sharing management service (authorization server) hosted by the bank to manage access to her various protected resources by spouse Bob, accounting professional Charline, and bank account aggregation company DecideAccount, all using different client applications, to view account data and get access to payment or withdrawal functions.

An OPTIONAL second specification, [UMAFedAuthz], defines a means for an UMA-enabled authorization server and resource server to be loosely coupled, or federated, in a resource owner context. This specification, together with [UMAFedAuthz], constitutes UMA 2.0.

1.1 Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Unless otherwise noted, all parameter names and values are case sensitive. JSON [RFC7159] data structures defined in this specification MAY contain extension parameters that are not defined in this specification. Any entity receiving or retrieving a JSON data structure SHOULD ignore extension parameters it is unable to understand. Extension names that are unprotected from collisions are outside the scope of this specification.

1.2 Roles

The UMA grant enhances the OAuth definitions of entities in order to accommodate the requesting party role.

resource owner

An entity capable of granting access to a protected resource, the "user" in User-Managed Access. The resource owner MAY be an end-user (natural person) or MAY be a non-human entity treated as a person for limited legal purposes (legal person), such as a corporation.
requesting party

A natural or legal person that uses a client to seek access to a protected resource. The requesting party may or may not be the same party as the resource owner.
client

An application that is capable of making requests for protected resources with the resource owner's authorization and on the requesting party's behalf.
resource server

A server that hosts resources on a resource owner's behalf and is capable of accepting and responding to requests for protected resources.
authorization server

A server that protects, on a resource owner's behalf, resources hosted at a resource server.

1.3 Abstract Flow

The UMA grant enhances the abstract protocol flow of OAuth.

Figure 1 shows an example flow. The steps and artifacts chosen in this figure show a high degree of variety for illustration purposes; for example, while both claims pushing and interactive claims gathering are shown, both might not be used in a single scenario.

rrequesting                             authorization resource resource
  party        client                      server     server    owner
    |            |                           |          |         |
    |            |                           |Set policy|         |
    |            |                           |conditions (anytime)|
    |            |                           |<- - - - - - - - - -|
    |            |Resource request (no access token)    |         |
    |            |------------------------------------->|         |
    |            |401 response with new permission      |         |
    |            |ticket, authz server location         |         |
    |            |<-------------------------------------|         |
    |            |Access token (RPT) request |          |         |
    |            |with permission ticket,    |          |         |
    |            |claim token (push claims)  |          |         |
    |            |-------------------------->|          |         |
    |            |                      +----|Authz     |         |
    |            |                      +--->|assessment|         |
    |            |403 response with rotated  |          |         |
    |            |permission ticket,         |          |         |
    |            |need_info error,           |          |         |
    |            |redirect_user hint         |          |         |
    |            |<--------------------------|          |         |
    |Redirect    |                           |          |         |
    |user with   |                           |          |         |
    |permission  |                           |          |         |
    |ticket      |                           |          |         |
    |<-----------|                           |          |         |
    |Follow redirect to authz server         |          |         |
    |--------------------------------------->|          |         |
    |Interactive claims gathering            |          |         |
    |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - >|          |         |
    |Redirect back with rotated permission   |          |         |
    |ticket                                  |          |         |
    |<---------------------------------------|          |         |
    |Follow      |                           |          |         |
    |redirect    |                           |          |         |
    |to client   |                           |          |         |
    |----------->|                           |          |         |
    |            |RPT request with permission|          |         |
    |            |ticket                     |          |         |
    |            |-------------------------->|          |         |
    |            |                      +----|Authz     |         |
    |            |                      +--->|assessment|         |
    |            |Response with RPT and PCT  |          |         |
    |            |<--------------------------|          |         |
    |            |Resource request with RPT  |          |         |
    |            |------------------------------------->|         |
    |            |Protected resource         |          |         |
    |            |<-------------------------------------|         |

Figure 1: Example Flow

Following are key concepts relevant to this specification:

requesting party token (RPT)
An access token associated with the UMA grant. An RPT is unique to a requesting party, client, authorization server, resource server, and resource owner.
permission
Authorized access to a particular resource with some number of scopes bound to that resource. A permission ticket represents some number of requested permissions. An RPT represents some number of granted permissions. Permissions are part of the authorization server's process and are opaque to the client.
permission ticket
A correlation handle representing requested permissions that is created and maintained by the authorization server, initially passed to the client by the resource server, and presented by the client at the token endpoint and during requesting party redirects.
persisted claims token (PCT)
A correlation handle issued by an authorization server that represents a set of claims collected during one authorization process, available for a client to use in attempting to optimize a future authorization process.
claim
A statement of the value or values of one or more attributes of an entity. The authorization server typically needs to collect and assess one or more claims of the requesting party or client against policy conditions as part of protecting a resource. The two methods available for UMA claims collection are claims pushing and interactive claims gathering. Note: Claims collection might involve authentication for unique user identification, but depending on policy conditions might additionally or instead involve the collection of non-uniquely identifying attributes, authorization for some action (for example, see Section 3.3.3), or other statements of agreement.
claim token
A package of claims provided directly by the client to the authorization server through claims pushing.
authorization process
The process through which the authorization server determines whether it should issue an RPT to the client on the requesting party's behalf, potentially based on a variety of inputs (see Section 1.3.1).

Note: How the client acquired knowledge of the resource server's interface and the specific endpoint of the desired protected resource is outside the scope of this specification. For example, the resource server might have a programmatic API or it might serve up simple web pages, and the resource owner might have advertised the endpoint publicly on a blog or other website, listed it in a discovery service, or emailed a link to a particular intended requesting party.

1.3.1 Authorization Process

The authorization process involves the following activities:

  • Claims collection. Claims pushing by a client is defined in Section 3.3.1, and interactive claims gathering with an end-user requesting party is defined in Section 3.3.2.
  • Authorization assessment (as defined in Section 3.3.4). Authorization assessment involves the authorization server assembling and evaluating policy conditions, scopes, claims, and any other relevant information sourced outside of UMA claims collection flows, in order to mitigate access authorization risk.
  • Authorization results determination (as defined in Section 3.3.4). The authorization server either returns a success code (as defined in Section 3.3.5), an RPT, and an optional PCT, or an error code (as defined in Section 3.3.6). If the error code is need_info or request_submitted, the authorization server provides a permission ticket, giving the client an opportunity to continue within the same authorization process (including engaging in further claims collection). In the case of a need_info error, the authorization server can provide hints about what the client should do next.

Different choices of claims collection methods, other inputs to authorization assessment, and need_info error hints might be best suited for different deployment ecosystems. For example, where no pre-established relationship is expected between the resource owner's authorization server and the requesting party, initial requesting party redirection might be a useful pattern, at which point the authorization server might either authenticate the requesting party locally or serve as a relying party for a remote identity provider. Where a common authorization server functions as an identity provider for all resource owners and requesting parties, having the client push claim tokens sourced from that central server itself with a pre-negotiated format and contents might be a useful pattern.


2. Authorization Server Metadata

The authorization server supplies metadata in a discovery document to declare its endpoints. The client uses this discovery document to discover these endpoints for use in the flows defined in Section 3.

The authorization server MUST make a discovery document available. The structure of the discovery document MUST conform to that defined in [OAuthMeta]. The discovery document MUST be available at an endpoint formed by concatenating the string /.well-known/uma2-configuration to the issuer metadata value defined in [OAuthMeta], using the well-known URI syntax and semantics defined in [RFC5785]. In addition to the metadata defined in [OAuthMeta], this specification defines the following metadata for inclusion in the discovery document:

claims_interaction_endpoint

OPTIONAL. A static endpoint URI at which the authorization server declares that it interacts with end-user requesting parties to gather claims. If the authorization server also provides a claims interaction endpoint URI as part of its redirect_user hint in a need_info response to a client on authorization failure (see Section 3.3.6), that value overrides this metadata value. Providing the static endpoint URI is useful for enabling interactive claims gathering prior to any pushed-claims flows taking place, so that, for example, it is possible to gather requesting party authorization interactively for collecting all other claims in a "silent" fashion.
uma_profiles_supported

OPTIONAL. UMA profiles and extensions supported by this authorization server. The value is an array of string values, where each string value is a URI identifying an UMA profile or extension. As discussed in Section 4, an authorization server supporting a profile or extension related to UMA SHOULD supply the specification's identifying URI (if any) here.

If the authorization server supports dynamic client registration, it MUST allow client applications to register claims_redirect_uri metadata, as defined in Section 3.3.2.


3. Flow Details

3.1 Client Requests Resource Without Providing an Access Token

The client requests a protected resource without providing any access token.

Note: This process does not assume that any relevant policy conditions have already been defined at the authorization server.

For an example of how the resource server can put resources under the protection of an authorization server, see [UMAFedAuthz].

Example of a client request at a protected resource carrying no token:

GET /users/alice/album/photo.jpg HTTP/1.1
Host: photoz.example.com
...

3.2 Resource Server Responds to Client's Tokenless Access Attempt

The resource server responds to the client's tokenless resource request.

The resource server MUST obtain a permission ticket from the authorization server to provide in its response, but the means of doing so is outside the scope of this specification. For an example of how the resource server can obtain the permission ticket, see [UMAFedAuthz].

The process of choosing what permissions to request from the authorization server may require interpretation and mapping of the client's resource request. The resource server SHOULD request a set of permissions with scopes that is reasonable for the client's resource request.

Note: In order for the resource server to know which authorization server to approach for the permission ticket and on which resource owner's behalf, it needs to derive the necessary information using cues provided by the structure of the API where the resource request was made, rather than by an access token. Commonly, this information can be passed through the URI, headers, or body of the client's request. Alternatively, the entire interface could be dedicated to the use of a single resource owner and protected by a single authorization server.

See Section 5.6 for permission ticket security considerations.

3.2.1 Resource Server Response to Client on Permission Request Success

If the resource server is able to provide a permission ticket from the authorization server, it responds to the client by providing a WWW-Authenticate header with the authentication scheme UMA, with the issuer URI from the authorization server's discovery document in an as_uri parameter and the permission ticket in a ticket parameter.

For example:

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: UMA realm="example",
  as_uri="https://as.example.com",
  ticket="016f84e8-f9b9-11e0-bd6f-0021cc6004de"
...

3.2.2 Resource Server Response to Client on Permission Request Failure

If the resource server is unable to provide a permission ticket from the authorization server, then it includes a header of the following form in its response to the client: Warning: 199 - "UMA Authorization Server Unreachable".

For example:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Warning: 199 - "UMA Authorization Server Unreachable"
...

Without an authorization server location and permission ticket, the client is unable to continue.

3.3 Client Seeks RPT on Requesting Party's Behalf

The client seeks issuance of an RPT from the token endpoint. Using this endpoint is one option for the client in beginning to engage with the authorization server as part of an authorization process. The other option is to redirect the requesting party for interactive claims gathering (see Section 3.3.2).

This process assumes that:

  • The client has obtained a permission ticket and an authorization server location from the resource server.
  • The client has retrieved the authorization server's discovery document as needed.
  • The client has obtained OAuth client credentials from the authorization server, either dynamically through [RFC7591] or [OIDCDynClientReg], or alternatively through a static process, and is prepared to authenticate itself to the token endpoint if appropriate.

3.3.1 Client Request to Authorization Server for RPT

The client makes a request to the token endpoint by sending the following parameters:

grant_type
REQUIRED. MUST be the value urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:uma-ticket.
ticket
REQUIRED. The most recent permission ticket received by the client as part of this authorization process.
claim_token
OPTIONAL. If this parameter is used, it MUST appear together with the claim_token_format parameter. A string containing directly pushed claim information in the indicated format. It MUST be base64url encoded unless specified otherwise by the claim token format. The client MAY provide this information on both first and subsequent requests to this endpoint. The client and authorization server together might need to establish proper audience restrictions for the claim token prior to claims pushing.
claim_token_format
OPTIONAL. If this parameter is used, it MUST appear together with the claim_token parameter. A string specifying the format of the claim token in which the client is directly pushing claims to the authorization server. The string MAY be a URI. Examples of potential types of claim token formats are [OIDCCore] ID Tokens and SAML assertions.
pct
OPTIONAL. If the authorization server previously returned a PCT along with an RPT, the client MAY include the PCT in order to optimize the process of seeking a new RPT. Given that some claims represented by a PCT are likely to contain identity information about a requesting party, a client supplying a PCT in its RPT request MUST make a best effort to ensure that the requesting party using the client now is the same as the requesting party that was associated with the PCT when it was issued. The client MAY use the PCT for the same requesting party when seeking an RPT for a resource different from the one sought when the PCT was issued, or a protected resource at a different resource server entirely. See Section 5.3 for additional PCT security considerations. See Section 3.3.5 for the form of the authorization server's response with a PCT.
rpt
OPTIONAL. Supplying an existing RPT gives the authorization server the option of upgrading that RPT instead of issuing a new one (see Section 3.3.5.1 for more about this option).
scope
OPTIONAL. A string of space-separated values representing requested scopes. For the authorization server to consider any requested scope in its assessment, the client MUST have pre-registered the same scope with the authorization server. The client should consult the resource server's API documentation for details about which scopes it can expect the resource server's initial returned permission ticket to represent as part of the authorization assessment (see Section 3.3.4).

Example of a request message with no optional parameters (line breaks are shown only for display convenience):

POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Authorization: Basic jwfLG53^sad$#f
...
grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Auma-ticket
&ticket=016f84e8-f9b9-11e0-bd6f-0021cc6004de

Example of a request message that includes an existing RPT for upgrading, a scope being sought that was previously registered with the authorization server, and a PCT and a claim token for consideration in the authorization process:

POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Authorization: Basic jwfLG53^sad$#f
...
grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Auma-ticket
&ticket=016f84e8-f9b9-11e0-bd6f-0021cc6004de
&claim_token=eyj0...
&claim_token_format=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fspecs%2Fopenid-connect-core-1_0.html%23IDToken
&pct=c2F2ZWRjb25zZW50
&rpt=sbjsbhs(/SSJHBSUSSJHVhjsgvhsgvshgsv
&scope=read

This specification provides a means to define profiles of claim token formats for use with UMA (see Section 4). The authorization server SHOULD document the profiles it supports in its discovery document.

3.3.2 Client Redirect of Requesting Party to Authorization Server for Interactive Claims-Gathering

The client redirects an end-user requesting party to the authorization server's claims interaction endpoint for one or more interactive claims-gathering processes as the authorization server requires. These can include direct interactions, such as account registration and authentication local to the authorization server as an identity provider, filling out a questionnaire, or asking the user to authorize persistent storage of any collected claims on a persistent basis to optimize future authorization processes; this last example could potentially be associated with the authorization server's subsequent issuance of a PCT. Interactions could also involve further redirection, for example, for federated (such as social) authentication at a remote identity provider, and other federated claims gathering.

Redirecting the requesting party to the authorization server is one option for the client in beginning to engage with the authorization server as part of an authorization process. The client might, for example, have initiated redirection on receiving an authorization failure response containing a redirect_user hint (see Section 3.3.6). The other option is to seek issuance of an RPT at the token endpoint (see Section 3.3).

If the client intends to redirect an end-user requesting party to the claims interaction endpoint before approaching the token endpoint, this process assumes, in addition to the other assumptions in Section 3.3, that the authorization server has statically declared its claims interaction endpoint in its discovery document.

The client constructs the request URI by adding the following parameters to the query component of the claims interaction endpoint URI using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format:

client_id
REQUIRED. The client's identifier issued by the authorization server.
ticket
REQUIRED. The most recent permission ticket received by the client as part of this authorization process.
claims_redirect_uri
REQUIRED if the client has pre-registered multiple claims redirection URIs or has pre-registered no claims redirection URI; OPTIONAL only if the client has pre-registered a single claims redirection URI. The URI to which the client wishes the authorization server to direct the requesting party's user agent after completing its interaction. The URI MUST be absolute, MAY contain an application/x-www-form-urlencoded-formatted query parameter component that MUST be retained when adding additional parameters, and MUST NOT contain a fragment component. The client SHOULD pre-register its claims_redirect_uri with the authorization server, and the authorization server SHOULD require all clients to pre-register their claims redirection endpoints. Claims redirection URIs are different from the redirection URIs defined in [RFC6749] in that they are intended for the exclusive use of requesting parties and not resource owners. Therefore, authorization servers MUST NOT redirect requesting parties to pre-registered redirection URIs defined in [RFC6749] unless such URIs are also pre-registered specifically as claims redirection URIs. If the URI is pre-registered, this URI MUST exactly match one of the pre-registered claims redirection URIs, with the matching performed as described in Section 6.2.1 of [RFC3986] (Simple String Comparison).
state
RECOMMENDED. An opaque value used by the client to maintain state between the request and callback. The authorization server includes this value when redirecting the user agent back to the client. The use of this parameter is for preventing cross-site request forgery (see Section 5.1 for further security information).

Example of a request issued by a client application (line breaks are shown only for display convenience):

GET /rqp_claims?client_id=some_client_id
&ticket=016f84e8-f9b9-11e0-bd6f-0021cc6004de
&state=abc
&claims_redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fredirect_claims HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com

3.3.3 Authorization Server Redirect of Requesting Party Back to Client After Interactive Claims-Gathering

At the conclusion of a successful interaction with the requesting party, the authorization server returns the requesting party to the client, adding the following parameters to the query component of the claims redirection URI using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format:

ticket
REQUIRED. A permission ticket that allows the client to make further requests to the authorization server during this authorization process. The value MUST NOT be the same as the one the client used to make its request.
state
OPTIONAL. The same state value that the client provided in the request. It MUST be present if and only if the client provided it (see Section 5.1 for further security information).

Note: Interactive claims-gathering processes are outside the scope of this specification. The purpose of the interaction is for the authorization server to gather information for its own authorization assessment purposes. This redirection does not involve sending any of the information back to the client.

The authorization server MAY use interactive claims-gathering to request authorization from the requesting party for persisting claims across authorization processes. Such persisted claims will be represented by a PCT issued to the client in a subsequent step.

The client MUST ignore unrecognized response parameters. If the request fails due to a missing, invalid, or mismatching claims redirection URI, or if the client identifier is missing or invalid, the authorization server SHOULD inform the requesting party of the error and MUST NOT automatically redirect the user agent to the invalid redirection URI.

If the request fails for reasons other than a missing or invalid claims redirection URI, the authorization server informs the client by adding an error parameter to the query component of the claims redirection URI as defined in Section 4.1.2.1 of [RFC6749].

Example of a response issued by an authorization server (line breaks are shown only for display convenience):

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.com/redirect_claims?
ticket=cHJpdmFjeSBpcyBjb250ZXh0LCBjb250cm9s&state=abc

3.3.4 Authorization Assessment and Results Determination

When the authorization server has received a request for an RPT from a client (see Section 3.3), it assesses whether the client is authorized to receive the requested RPT and determines the results.

The authorization server MUST apply the following conceptual authorization assessment calculation in determining authorization results. Note: As this calculation is internal to authorization server operations, its particulars are outside the scope of this specification.

In this assessment calculation, let a set called ClientRegistered stand for the scopes for which the client pre-registered at the authorization server, either dynamically or through some static process. Let a set called ClientRequested stand for the scopes the client most recently requested at the token endpoint. Let a set called PermissionTicket stand for the scopes associated with the permission ticket presented by the client at the token endpoint.

  1. Determine the set of requested scopes as follows: RequestedScopes = PermissionTicket ∪ (ClientRequested ∩ ClientRegistered). Treat each scope in (ClientRequested ∩ ClientRegistered) as applying to all matching resource-bound scopes in PermissionTicket.
  2. Determine all operative policy conditions, and claims and other relevant information serving as input to them, for each scope assocated with RequestedScopes and evaluate its authorization status.
  3. For each scope that passes the evaluation, add it to a set called CandidateGrantedScopes.

Note: Claims and other information gathered during one authorization process may become out of date in terms of their relevance for future authorization processes. The authorization server is responsible for managing such relevance wherever information associated with a PCT, or other persistently stored information, is used as input to authorization, including policy conditions themselves.

Note: Since the authorization server's policy expression and evaluation capabilities are outside the scope of this specification, any one implementation might take a simple or arbitrarily complex form, with varying abilities to combine or perform calculations over claims and their values. For example, logical operations such as accepting "either claim value A or claim value B" as correct might be possible.

In the authorization results phase, the authorization server examines the CandidateGrantedScopes set to determine whether to issue an RPT and what permissions should be associated with it.

  • If CandidateGrantedScopes = RequestedScopes, then the authorization server subsequently responds with a success code and issues an RPT.
  • If CandidateGrantedScopes < RequestedScopes, the authorization server subsequently issues either an RPT containing CandidateGrantedScopes, or one of the error codes. The reason for the two options is that granting only partial scopes might not be useful for the client's and requesting party's purposes in seeking authorization for access.

Note: It is not an error for the client to have requested a scope for which it did not pre-register because RequestedScopes might include that same scope, requested on the client's behalf by the resource server when obtaining the permission ticket. However, if such a scope were requested only by the client at the token endpoint, that scope would not be included in RequestedScopes.

The following example illustrates authorization assessment and partial results:

  • Assume two resources at a resource server, photo1 with scopes view, print, and download and photo2 with scopes view, print, download, and link.
  • The resource owner has set policy conditions that allow access to photo1 only by requesting parties that can provide claims proving they are family members, and that allow access to photo2 only by requesting parties that can provide claims saying they agree not to download, sell, or market any photo.
  • The client has pre-registered with the authorization server for download scope (so ClientRegistered contains download).
  • The client requests a resource, in what the resource server interprets as an attempt for view access to photo1.
  • The nature of the resource server's API results in the resource server's permission ticket from the authorization server representing a request for view and print scopes for photo1 on the client's behalf (so PermissionTicket contains view and print).
  • The client requests download scope on the requesting party's behalf while requesting an RPT from the authorization server (so ClientRequested contains download).
  • The authorization server determines that RequestedScopes contains view, print, and download.
  • Based on the authorization server's evaluation of policy conditions associated with these scopes, CandidateGrantedScopes contains only view and print and not download (the dynamically requested scope), which is less than in RequestedScopes.
  • The authorization server has a choice whether to issue an RPT in this case.

See Section 5.7 for a discussion of authorization implementation threats.

3.3.5 Authorization Server Response to Client on Authorization Success

If the authorization server's assessment process results in issuance of permissions, it issues the RPT with which it has associated the permissions by using the successful response form defined in Section 5.1 of [RFC6749].

The authorization server MAY return a refresh token. See Section 3.6 for more information about refreshing an RPT.

The authorization server MAY add the following parameters to its response:

pct
OPTIONAL. A correlation handle representing claims and other information collected during this authorization process, which the client is able to present later in order to optimize future authorization processes on behalf of a requesting party. The PCT MUST be unguessable by an attacker. The PCT MUST NOT disclose claims from the requesting party directly to possessors of the PCT. Instead, such claims SHOULD be associated by reference to the PCT or expressed in an encrypted format that can be decrypted only by the authorization server that issued the PCT. See Section 3.3.2 for more information about the end-user requesting party interaction option. See Section 5.3 for additional PCT security considerations.
upgraded
OPTIONAL. Boolean value. If the client submits an RPT in the request and the authorization server includes the permissions of the RPT from the request as part of the newly issued RPT, then it MUST set this value to true. If it sets the value to false or the value is absent, the client MUST act as if the newly issued RPT does not include the permissions associated with the RPT from the request. (See Section 3.3.5.1.)

The authorization server MAY include any of the parameters defined in Section 5.1 of [RFC6749] on its response, except that it SHOULD NOT include the scope parameter. This is because for an RPT's permissions, each scope is associated with a specific resource, even though this association is opaque to the client. Note: The outcome of authorization assessment may result in expiration periods for RPTs, permissions, and refresh tokens that can affect the client's later requests for refreshing the RPT.

Example:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
... 

{  
   "access_token":"sbjsbhs(/SSJHBSUSSJHVhjsgvhsgvshgsv",
   "token_type":"Bearer"
}

Example with a PCT in the response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
...

{  
   "access_token":"sbjsbhs(/SSJHBSUSSJHVhjsgvhsgvshgsv",
   "token_type":"Bearer",
   "pct":"c2F2ZWRjb25zZW50"
}
3.3.5.1 Authorization Server Upgrades RPT

The authorization server MAY implement RPT upgrading. The authorization server SHOULD document its practices regarding RPT upgrades and to act consistently with respect to RPT upgrades so as to enable clients to manage received RPTs efficiently.

If the authorization server has implemented RPT upgrading, the client has submitted an RPT in its request, and the result is success, the authorization server adds the permissions from the client's previous RPT to the RPT it is about to issue, setting the value of upgraded in its response containing the upgraded RPT to true.

If the authorization server is upgrading an RPT, and the RPT string is new rather than repeating the RPT provided by the client in the request, then the authorization server SHOULD revoke the existing RPT, if possible, and the client MUST discard its previous RPT. If the authorization server does not upgrade the RPT but issues a new RPT, the client MAY retain the existing RPT.

Example with upgraded in the response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
...

{  
   "access_token":"sbjsbhs(/SSJHBSUSSJHVhjsgvhsgvshgsv",
   "token_type":"Bearer",
   "upgraded":true
}

3.3.6 Authorization Server Response to Client on Authorization Failure

If the client's request to the token endpoint is insufficient for granting an RPT, the authorization server responds using an error code and corresponding HTTP status code.

invalid_grant
If the provided permission ticket was not found at the authorization server, or the provided permission ticket has expired, or the client is not authorized to have these permissions added, or any other original reasons to use this error response are found as defined in [RFC6749], the authorization server responds with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code.
invalid_scope
At least one of the scopes included in the request does not match an available scope for any of the resources associated with requested permissions for the permission ticket provided by the client. The authorization server responds with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code.
request_submitted
The authorization server requires intervention by the resource owner to determine whether the client is authorized to have these permissions. The authorization server responds with the HTTP 403 (Forbidden) status code. It MUST include a ticket parameter.
ticket
REQUIRED. A permission ticket that allows the client to make a further request to the authorization server's token endpoint as part of this same authorization process, likely some time later in "polling" fashion, when the resource owner might have completed some approval (or denial) action. The value MUST NOT be the same as the one the client used to make its request.
need_info
The authorization server needs additional information in order to determine whether the client is authorized to have these permissions. The authorization server responds with the HTTP 403 (Forbidden) status code. It MUST include a ticket parameter, and it MUST also include either the required_claims parameter or the redirect_user parameter, or both, as hints about information the authorization server needs for performing authorization assessment. On receiving such hints, the client has the opportunity to participate in follow-on claims collection.
ticket
REQUIRED. A permission ticket that allows the client to make a further request to the authorization server's token endpoint as part of this same authorization process, potentially immediately. The value MUST NOT be the same as the one the client used to make its request.
required_claims
An array of objects that describe the required claims, with the following subparameters:
claim_token_format
OPTIONAL. An array of strings specifying a set of acceptable formats for a claim token pushed by the client containing this claim, as defined in Section 3.3.1. Any one of the referenced formats would satisfy the authorization server's requirements. Each string MAY be a URI.
claim_type
OPTIONAL. A string, indicating the expected interpretation of the provided claim value. The string MAY be a URI.
friendly_name
OPTIONAL. A string that provides a human-readable form of the claim's name. This can be useful as a "display name" for use in user interfaces in cases where the actual name is complex or opaque, such as an OID or a UUID.
issuer
OPTIONAL. An array of strings specifying a set of acceptable issuing authorities for the claim. Any one of the referenced authorities would satisfy the authorization server's requirements. Each string MAY be a URI.
name
OPTIONAL. A string (which MAY be a URI) representing the name of the claim; the "key" in a key-value pair.
redirect_user
The claims interaction endpoint URI to which to redirect the end-user requesting party at the authorization server to continue the process of interactive claims gathering, as defined in Section 3.3.2. For example, the authorization server could require the requesting party to log in to an account, or fill out a CAPTCHA to help prove humanness, or perform any number of other interactive tasks. If the requesting party is not an end-user, then no client action is possible on receiving the hint. If a static claims interaction endpoint was also provided in the authorization server's discovery document, then this value overrides the static value. Providing a value in this response might be appropriate, for example, if the URI needs to be customized per requesting party with a query parameter.

Example when the permission ticket was not found or has expired, or the client's request has failed outright:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
...

{  
   "error":"invalid_grant"
}

Example of a need_info response with both types of hints:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
...

{  
   "error":"need_info",
   "ticket":"ZXJyb3JfZGV0YWlscw==",
   "required_claims":[  
      {  
         "claim_token_format":[  
            "http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#IDToken"
         ],
         "claim_type":"urn:oid:0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.3",
         "friendly_name":"email",
         "issuer":[  
            "https://example.com/idp"
         ],
         "name":"email23423453ou453"
      }
   ],
   "redirect_user":"https://as.example.com/rqp_claims?id=2346576421"
}

3.4 Client Requests Resource and Provides an RPT

The client requests the resource, now in possession of an RPT. The client uses [RFC6750] for a bearer token, and any other suitable presentation mechanism for an RPT of another access token type.

Example of a client request for the resource carrying an RPT:

GET /users/alice/album/photo.jpg HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer sbjsbhs(/SSJHBSUSSJHVhjsgvhsgvshgsv
Host: photoz.example.com
...

3.5 Resource Server Responds to Client's RPT-Accompanied Resource Request

The resource server responds to the client's RPT-accompanied resource request.

If the resource access request fails, the resource server responds as if the request were unaccompanied by an access token, as defined in Section 3.2.

The resource server MUST NOT give access in the case of an invalid RPT or an RPT associated with insufficient authorization.

For an example of how the resource server can introspect the RPT and its permissions at the authorization server prior to responding to the client's request, see [UMAFedAuthz].

3.6 Authorization Server Refreshes RPT

As noted in Section 3.3.5, when issuing an RPT, the authorization server MAY also issue a refresh token.

Having previously received a refresh token from the authorization server, the client MAY use the refresh token grant as defined in [RFC6749] to attempt to refresh an expired RPT. If the client includes the scope parameter in its request, the authorization server MAY limit the scopes in the permissions associated with any resulting refreshed RPT to the scopes requested by the client.

The authorization server MUST NOT treat the client's request to refresh an RPT as if it were a request for a new RPT requiring an authorization assessment calculation.

3.7 Client Requests Token Revocation

If the authorization server presents a token revocation endpoint as defined in [RFC7009], the client MAY use the endpoint to request revocation of an RPT (access token), refresh token, or PCT previously issued to it on behalf of a requesting party. This specification defines the following token type hint value:

pct
Helps the authorization server optimize lookup of a PCT for revocation.

4. Profiles and Extensions

An UMA profile restricts UMA's available options. An UMA extension defines how to use UMA's extensibility points. The two can be combined. Some reasons for creating profiles and extensions include:

The following actions are RECOMMENDED regarding the creation and use of profiles and extensions:


5. Security Considerations

This specification relies mainly on OAuth 2.0 security mechanisms as well as transport-level encryption. Thus, implementers are strongly advised to read [BCP195] and the security considerations in [RFC6749] (Section 10) and [RFC6750] (Section 5) along with the security considerations of any other OAuth token-defining specifications in use, along with the entire [RFC6819] specification, and apply the countermeasures described therein. As well, implementers should take into account the security considerations in all other normatively referenced specifications.

The following sections describe additional security considerations.

5.1 Cross-Site Request Forgery

Similar to the redirection used at OAuth's authorization endpoint, UMA redirection for the purpose of gathering claims interactively from an end-user requesting party (described in Section 3.3.2) creates the potential for cross-site request forgery (CSRF) through an open redirect if the authorization server does not force the client to pre-register its claims redirection endpoint, and server-side artifact tampering if the client does not avail itself of the state parameter.

If the client uses the redirection-based interactive claims gathering feature, the client MUST implement CSRF protection for its claims redirection URI. The client SHOULD use the state parameter when redirecting the requesting party to the claims interaction endpoint. The value of the state parameter MUST be unguessable by an attacker. Once the authorization server redirects the requesting party back, with the required binding value contained in the state parameter, the client MUST check that the value of the state parameter received is equal to the value sent in the initial redirection request. Depending on the type of application, a client has several methods for storing and later verifying the value of the state parameter in between the initial redirect and the eventual resulting request to the claims redirection URI, including storage in a server-side session-bound variable, cryptographic derivation from a browser cookie, or secure application-level storage. The client MUST treat requests containing an invalid or unknown state parameter value as an error.

A CSRF attack against the authorization server's claims interaction endpoint can result in an attacker obtaining authorization for access through a malicious client without involving or alerting the end-user requesting party. The authorization server MUST implement CSRF protection for its claims interaction endpoint and ensure that a malicious client cannot obtain authorization without the awareness and involvement of the requesting party.

The state parameter SHOULD NOT include sensitive client or requesting party information in plain text, as it is transmitted through third party components (the requesting party's user agent) and could be stored insecurely.

5.2 Requesting Party Switching and RPT Exposure to a Requesting Party

When a client redirects an end-user requesting party to the claims interaction endpoint, the client provides no a priori context to the authorization server about which user is appearing at the endpoint, other than implicitly through the permission ticket. Since the authorization server is free to gather any claims it wishes, the effect is to "late-bind" them to the permission ticket and the state parameter string provided by the client, with the effect of enabling the authorization server not to trust client-asserted claims. This is a desirable result and reflects one reason why the authorization server might choose to demand use of the redirect flow over the push flow. However, the client has the opportunity to switch end-users -- say, enabling malicious end-user Carlos to impersonate the original end-user Bob, who might be represented by a PCT already in that client's possession and might even have authorized the issuance of that PCT -- after the redirect completes and before it returns to the token endpoint to seek permissions.

Another issue concerns the exposure of an RPT to a requesting party, which could maliciously pass the RPT to an unauthorized party.

To mitigate requesting-party switching and RPT exposure threats, consider the following strategies.

  • Require that the requesting party legitimately represent the wielder of the bearer token on a legal or contractual level. This solution does not reduce the risk from a technical perspective.
  • The authorization server, possibly with input from the resource owner, can implement tighter time-to-live strategies around the permissions in RPTs. This is a classic approach with bearer tokens that helps to limit a malicious party's ability to intercept and use the bearer token. In the same vein, the authorization server could require claims to have a reasonable degree of freshness (which would require a custom claims profile).
  • A stronger strategy is to gather claims interactively from an end-user requesting party that demonstrate that some sufficiently strong level of authentication was performed.

5.3 Requesting Party Claims and Persisted Claims Tokens

A PCT is similar to a refresh token in that it allows non-interactive issuance of access tokens. The authorization server and client MUST keep PCTs confidential in transit and storage, and MUST NOT share any PCT with any entity other than the issuer or issued client, respectively. The authorization server MUST maintain the binding between a PCT and the client to which it was issued.

Given that a PCT represents a set of requesting party claims, a client supplying a PCT in its RPT request MUST make a best effort to ensure that the requesting party using the client now is the same as the requesting party that was associated with the PCT when it was issued. Different clients will have different capabilities in this respect; for example, some applications are single-user and perform no local authentication, associating all PCTs with the "current user", while others might have more sophisticated authentication and user mapping capabilities.

5.4 Strengthening RPT Protection Using Proof of Possession

After the client's resource request with an RPT, assuming the client sent an RPT of the bearer style such as defined in [RFC6750], the resource server will have received from the client the entire secret portion of the token. This specification assumes only bearer-type tokens because they are the only type standardized as of this specification's publication. However, to strengthen protection for RPTs using a proof-of-possession approach, the resource server could receive an RPT that consists of only a cryptographically signed token identifier, and then to validate the signature, it could, for example, submit the token identifier to the token introspection endpoint to obtain the necessary key information. The details of this usage are outside the scope of this specification.

5.5 Credentials-Guessing

The authorization server MUST prevent attackers from guessing permission tickets and PCTs.

5.6 Permission Ticket Management

The authorization server MUST make permission ticket values unguessable by resource servers and clients. Within these constraints, however, the authorization server MAY format the ticket however it chooses, for example either as a random string that references data held on the server or by including data within the ticket itself.

Permission tickets MUST be single-use. This prevents susceptibility to a session fixation attack.

The authorization server MUST invalidate a permission ticket when the client presents the permission ticket to either the token endpoint or the claims interaction endpoint, or when the permission ticket expires, whichever occurs first.

The client SHOULD check that the value of the ticket parameter it receives back from the authorization server in each response and each redirect of the requesting party back to it differs from the one it sent to the server in the initial request or redirect.

5.7 Naive Implementations of Default-Deny Authorization

While a reasonable approach for most scenarios is to implement the classic stance of default-deny ("everything that is not expressly allowed is forbidden"), corner cases can inadvertently result in default-permit behavior. For example, it is insufficient to create default "empty" policy conditions stating "no claims are needed", and then accept an empty set of supplied claims as sufficient for access.

5.8 Profiles and Trust Establishment

Parties that are operating and using UMA software entities may need to establish agreements about the parties' rights and responsibilities on a legal or contractual level, along with common interpretations of UMA constructs for consistent and expected software behavior. These agreements can be used to improve the parties' respective security postures, and written profiles are a key mechanism for conveying and enforcing these agreements. Section 4 discusses profiling. See [UMA-legal] to learn about tools to assist in the legal and contractual elements of deploying UMA-enabled services.

5.8.1 Requirements for Trust When Clients Push Claim Tokens

This section discusses the threats surrounding client claims pushing (see Section 3.3.1).

Because claim tokens of any format typically contain audience restrictions and an authorization server would typically not be in the primary audience for a claim token held or generated by a client, it is RECOMMENDED to document how the client, authorization server, and any additional ecosystem entities and parties will establish a trust relationship and communicate any required keying material in a claim token profile, as described in Section 4. Authorization servers are RECOMMENDED not to accept claim tokens pushed by untrusted clients and not to ignore audience restrictions found in claim tokens pushed by clients.

Some deployments could have exceptional circumstances allowing the authorization server to validate claim tokens. For example, if the authorization server is also the identity provider for the requesting party, then it would be able to validate any ID tokens it issued to the client and also ensure they were issued to the client presenting the claim token.


6. Privacy Considerations

UMA has the following privacy considerations.

6.1 Requesting Party Information at the Authorization Server

Claims are likely to contain personal, personally identifiable, and sensitive information, particularly in the case of requesting parties who are end-users.

If the authorization server supports persisting claims for any length of time (for example, to support issuance of PCTs), then it SHOULD provide a secure and privacy-protected means of storing claim data. It is also RECOMMENDED for the authorization server to use an interactive claims-gathering flow to ask an end-user requesting party for authorization to persist their claims before issuing a PCT. A requesting party who provides claims to an authorization server once having been redirected there is less susceptible to privacy-destroying behavior. Otherwise, certain flows such as claims pushing and interactive federated sign-in with automatic login will tend to be invisible to the user if they have not consciously authorized the possibility.

6.2 Resource Owner Information at the Resource Server

Since the client's initial request for a protected resource is made in an unauthorized and unauthenticated context, such requests are by definition open to all users. The response to that request includes the authorization server's location to enable the client to request an access token and present claims. If it is known out of band that authorization server is owned and controlled by a single user, or visiting the authorization server contains other identifying information, then an unauthenticated and unauthorized client would be able to tell which resource owner is associated with a given resource. Other information about the resource owner, such as organizational affiliation or group membership, may be gained from this transaction as well.

6.3 Profiles and Trust Establishment

Parties that are operating and using UMA software entities may need to establish agreements about mutual rights, responsibilities, and common interpretations of UMA constructs for consistent and expected software behavior. These agreements can be used to improve the parties' respective privacy postures. See Section 5.8 for more information. Additional considerations related to Privacy by Design concepts are discussed in [UMA-PbD].


7. IANA Considerations

This document makes the following requests of IANA.

7.1 Well-Known URI Registration

This specification registers the well-known URI defined in Section 2, as required by Section 5.1 of [RFC5785].

7.1.1 Registry Contents

  • URI suffix: uma2-configuration
  • Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  • Specification document: Section 2 in this document

7.2 OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata Registry

This specification registers OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata defined in Section 2, as required by Section 7.1 of [OAuthMeta].

7.2.1 Registry Contents

  • Metadata name: claims_interaction_endpoint
  • Metadata description: endpoint metadata
  • Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  • Specification document: Section 2 in this document
  • Metadata name: uma_profiles_supported
  • Metadata description: profile/extension feature metadata
  • Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  • Specification document: Section 2 in this document

7.3 OAuth 2.0 Extension Grant Parameters Registration

This specification registers the parameters defined in Section 3.3.1, as required by Section 11.2 of [RFC6749].

7.3.1 Registry Contents

  • Parameter name: claim_token
  • Parameter usage location: client request, token endpoint
  • Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  • Specification document: Section 3.3.1 in this document
  • Parameter name: pct
  • Parameter usage location: client request, token endpoint
  • Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  • Specification document: Section 3.3.1 in this document
  • Parameter name: pct
  • Parameter usage location: authorization server response, token endpoint
  • Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  • Specification document: Section 3.3.5 in this document
  • Parameter name: rpt
  • Parameter usage location: client request, token endpoint
  • Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  • Specification document: Section 3.3.1 in this document
  • Parameter name: ticket
  • Parameter usage location: client request, token endpoint
  • Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  • Specification document: Section 3.3.1 in this document
  • Parameter name: upgraded
  • Parameter usage location: authorization server response, token endpoint
  • Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  • Specification document: Section 3.3.5 in this document

7.4 OAuth 2.0 Extensions Error Registration

This specification registers the errors defined in Section 3.3.6, as required by Section 11.4 of [RFC6749].

7.4.1 Registry Contents

  • Error name: need_info (and its subsidiary parameters)
  • Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  • Specification document: Section 3.3.6 in this document
  • Error usage location: authorization server response, token endpoint
  • Error name: request_submitted (and its subsidiary ticket parameter)
  • Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  • Specification document: Section 3.3.6 in this document
  • Error usage location: authorization server response, token endpoint

7.5 OAuth Token Type Hints Registration

This specification registers the errors defined in Section 3.7, as required by Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7009].

7.5.1 Registry Contents

  • Hint value: pct
  • Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  • Specification document: Section 3.7 in this document

8. Acknowledgments

The following people made significant text contributions to the specification:

Additional contributors to this specification include the Kantara UMA Work Group participants, a list of whom can be found at [UMAnitarians].


9. References

9.1 Normative References

[BCP195]Sheffer, Y., “Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)”, May 2015, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp195>.
[OIDCCore]Sakimura, N., “OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 1”, November 2014, <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[OIDCDynClientReg]Sakimura, N., “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 incorporating errata set 1”, November 2014, <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-registration-1_0.html>.
[UMAFedAuthz]Maler, E., “Federated Authorization for User-Managed Access (UMA) 2.0”, May 2017, <https://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/wg/oauth-uma-federated-authz-2.0-05.html>.
[OAuthMeta]Jones, M., “OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata”, March 2017, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-discovery-06>.
[RFC2119]Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986]Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, “Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax”, STD 66, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5785]Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, “Defining Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)”, RFC 5785, DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC6749]Hardt, D., Ed., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework”, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750]Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage”, RFC 6750, DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC6819]Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, “OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations”, RFC 6819, DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.
[RFC7159]Bray, T., Ed., “The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format”, RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7591]Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and P. Hunt, “OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol”, RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[RFC7009]Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, “OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation”, RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009, August 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>.

9.2 Informative References

[UMA-PbD]Maler, E., “Privacy by Design Implications of UMA”, 2013, <https://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Privacy+by+Design+Implications+of+UMA>.
[UMAnitarians]Maler, E., “UMA Participant Roster”, 2017, <https://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Participant+Roster>.
[UMA-legal]Maler, E., “UMA Legal”, 2017, <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+Legal>.

Authors' Addresses

Eve Maler (editor)
ForgeRock
EMail: eve.maler@forgerock.com

Maciej Machulak
Self
EMail: maciej.machulak@gmail.com

Justin Richer
Bespoke Engineering
EMail: justin@bspk.io